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because the former countries specialise in similar products as Turkey. With respect to the sectoral implications, the removal of economic barriers to integration may have different implications for the labour-intensive agricultural and textile sectors than for skill-intensive sectors.
In exploring these questions, the paper follows the approach of Lejour et al. (2004) . For 15 different industries, we derive the potential trade between the EU and Turkey from estimating gravity equations. By comparing this potential trade with actual trade, we estimate the tariff equivalent of the remaining trade barriers between Turkey and the EU. These barriers are then removed to simulate the accession of Turkey to the EU internal market, thereby using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for the world economy that is calibrated on data for 2001.
In the process of accession, Turkey has to comply with the acquis communautaire. This could act as a catalyst for improving institutions in Turkey. Many institutional indicators show that these institutions are less market-oriented in Turkey than in the EU member states or the 2 The EU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe eliminate bliateral import tariffs in manufacturing already during the 1990s. However these Europe agreements implied less trade integration than the customs union between Turkey and the EU. For instance, a customs union also involves the same external tariffs with respect to third countries. other accession countries. We investigate to what extent a reform of these institutions could benefit the Turkish economy by improving its competitive position. Again, we do this by deriving the potential trade between Turkey and other countries if the institutions would be improved by estimating a gravity equation for trade. We then simulate the macroeconomic effects of this trade increase with our CGE model.
As a final step, we elaborate on the potential migration flows following the accession of Turkey to the EU. With our CGE model, we explore the implications for labour markets.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the Turkish economy.
Section 3 demonstrates what kind of shocks the accession of Turkey to the EU would imply.
Section 4 elaborates on the main features of the WorldScan model and assesses the impact of various shocks on the economies of both the EU and Turkey. Finally, section 5 concludes.
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The Turkish economy accede to the EU in 2004 (Accession-10), and Bulgaria and Romania. We see that Turkey is a relatively large accession country. Its size in terms of population (more than 68 million people) approaches that of the Accession-10 and exceeds the size of each current EU Member State, except for Germany. The Turkish accession would imply that the EU population would increase by more than 17%. In terms of GDP, the accession of Turkey would imply a more modest expansion of the EU.
Indeed, GDP would rise by 2.2% of today's level of GDP in the EU-15. The Turks thus earn a much lower income per capita than the average EU citizen. Expressed in terms of purchasing power parities, gross national income per capita in Turkey is only 30% of that in the EU-15.
This income is of a similar level as in Romania and somewhat higher than in Bulgaria. It is, 6 however, below the average level in the Accession-10, which is 44% of the EU-15 average in 2000. The unemployment rate in Turkey was 8.5% in 2000. 3
Trade relations
Trade liberalisation has been an important aspect of Turkey's economic policy since the early 1980's. It led to the formation of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in 1995, which covers trade in industrial goods and processed agricultural products. The agreement with Turkey goes beyond a normal Customs Union, though. It also covers the harmonisation of technical legislation, the abolishment of monopolies and the protection of intellectual property.
Moreover, negotiations have been started on the mutual opening of the public procurement markets, liberalisation of trade in services, and the abolition of restrictions on the freedom of establishment. These latter policies would prepare Turkey for membership of the EU.
Trade liberalisation has intensified economic integration of Turkey and the rest of the world.
To illustrate, whereas the sum of imports and exports as a share of GDP was still only 18% in 1980, this share has increased to almost 50% in 1999. share of more than 60%. A relatively low degree of openness implies that a trade increase due to the internal market has less effect on the total economy than for countries with a higher degree of openness.
Most European countries export only a small part of all their goods and services to Turkey.
Indeed, the average export share of the EU-15 to Turkey is 1.2%. This share is four times smaller than for the other accession countries, which feature an average export share of around 5%. An average Accession-10 country has Turkey as a destination for only 0.5% of all exports.
Being neighbouring countries, Bulgaria and Romania bring 10.3% and 6.1% of their exports to Turkey, respectively. The final column of table 2.2 shows the export shares with a destination in the EU-15. We see that, similar to Accession-10 and Bulgaria and Romania, the majority of all exports from Turkey are transported to the EU-15. This reflects the agreement on the customs union between Turkey and the EU, which has intensified economic integration between these regions since 1995. Transport and Business Services are also important in absolute terms: they make up more than 50% of all exports of Turkey, since these sectors are relatively open. 8 The comparative advantages of Turkey to some extent mimic those from the other accession countries (see Lejour et al., 2004) . In particular, both specialise in Agriculture, Textiles and Wearing Apparel. Accordingly, the accession of Turkey to the EU could affect the competitiveness of the Central and Eastern European Countries in these sectors. Yet, there are also some important differences. Most of the Accession-10 countries export more machinery products and more products from the Food Processing industry, while Turkey exports relatively more Business and Other Services. The ratio of exports to production in business and other services, and construction is much higher than in other countries. Given the low quality of the service trade data it is not clear that these data reflect a strong international position of Turkey in these sectors.
Turkey's accession to the EU

Turkey's development without accession
How would the Turkish economy develop over the next twenty years if the country would not accede to the EU? One can imagine different scenarios. Turkey could integrate economically with the EU, without becoming a full member. In that case, the Customs Union may be further deepened, without Turkey becoming part of the internal market. Alternatively, Turkey could become disappointed about its cooperation with the EU and decide to focus more on its relationship with its eastern neighbours in Asia. In that case, a process of disintegration with the EU may become real.
Uncertainty about the future development in the absence of accession to the EU renders it difficult to assess the economic implications of the accession itself. Against what scenario should we compare the accession? We adopt the usual approach in model simulations by developing a baseline scenario in which the current situation is extrapolated into the future.
Thus, the baseline neither assumes a tendency towards disintegration, nor a tendency towards more integration. The impact of the accession to the EU is then determined by comparing the economic outcomes of a scenario with accession to the baseline.
In the next section, we follow this approach by simulating the economic implications of the Turkish accession with a CGE model called WorldScan. We develop a baseline until 2025 in which the relationship between Turkey and the EU remains as it is today, i.e. a customs union in industrial products, a limited degree of integration with respect to the internal market, but neither full membership of the EU nor further integration in other respects. In the baseline, we assume that ten candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe become member of the EU in 2004 while Bulgaria and Romania accede in 2007. We also assume that the international agreement of textiles and clothing (ATC) vanishes in 2005 such that the Turkish textile sector will face more competition from Asian countries. With regard to Turkey, we include demographic projections based on the UN, which suggests that population grows from 68 million in 2001 to around 86 million in 2025. We do not include substantial reforms in Turkish policy as compared to today's situation. Economic growth in Turkey in the baseline scenario exceeds that in the EU due to a catching up. In particular, the baseline assumes a real growth rate of GDP of 5.6% per year in Turkey, which is partly due to a relatively fast growing population. GDP per capita grows annually by 4.5%. 9 In the Accession-10, growth is lower at 2.9% per year, in part because of a gradual shrinking population (0.3% annually). GDP in the EU is assumed to grow at 2% per year during the coming decades.
Relative to the baseline scenario, we explore the economic implications of the Turkish accession. In particular, we determine first the long-term economic outcomes in the baseline scenario and then compare them with the outcomes in a scenario with accession of Turkey.
Thereby, we assume that Turkey becomes a member of the EU in 2010. The exact date, however, has no significant impact on the long-term simulation outcomes. An important question is: what effects do we attribute to the accession of Turkey. In the next subsections, we discuss four changes that are induced by Turkey's accession to the EU. These are, respectively, accession to the internal European market, an improvement of Turkish institutions in response 9 Differences in total factor productivity growth rates for the manufacturing sectors in Turkey are taken from Filiztekin (2000) .
These data for the period 1980-1996 indicate high productivity growth in the sectors Metals and Machinery and Equipment and low productivity growth in food processing and other manufacturing. Also in Textiles and Wearing Apparel, productivity growth is lower than the average in manufacturing.
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to EU-membership, and free movement of labour. We do not explore the possible access of Turkey to EU funds since we find it impossible to predict the outcome of the political negotiations regarding the EU budget at the time Turkey accedes to the EU.
Accession to the internal market
A major economic aspect of the accession of Turkey to the EU involves the accession to the internal market. This will affect the economies of Turkey and EU members via trade, FDI, domestic investment, and so on. The focus here is on the trade effect of the internal market.
Accession to the internal market may increase trade for at least three reasons. First, administrative barriers to trade will be eliminated or at least reduced to levels comparable to those between current EU members. Here, one can think of reduced costs of passing customs at the frontier: less time delays, less formalities etc. Anecdotic evidence suggests that there is a lot to be gained here in the case of Turkey. Secondly, accession to the internal market implies a reduction in technical barriers to trade. The Single Market reduces these technical barriers by means of mutual recognition of different technical regulations, minimum requirements and harmonisation of rules and regulations. Although the customs union between Turkey and the EU has already eliminated some of these technical barriers, it appears that substantial further advances have to be made. Finally, risk and uncertainty will be mitigated by the Turkish accession to the EU. Especially political risks and macroeconomic instability may reduce substantially.
In measuring the economic implications of accession to the internal market, we follow the approach of Lejour et al. (2004) . That study shows for the countries from Central and Eastern Europe that the accession to the internal market is much more important than the elimination of bilateral trade tariffs and common external tariffs as in a customs union. That conclusion and the existing customs union between Turkey and the EU in manufacturing suggest that the accession to the internal market is the relevant issue, and not the elimination of remaining tariffs and harmonisation of external tariffs. 10 
where X ijs stands for the log of exports from country i to j in industry s. The vector Z ijs contains several explanatory variables, including GDP (per capita) of the exporting and importing countries, the distance between the capitals of countries, a set of dummies, and the bilateral import and export tariffs between countries. The vector α s contains the parameters we estimate 12 for each sector. The variable D EU is a dummy that equals unity if i and j are currently members of the EU and else zero.
We have estimated (1) by OLS using a cross-section of 38 countries for 2001 based on the GTAP data (Dinamaran and McDougall 2004). The estimates for fifteen different sectors are reported in table 3.1. An asterisk indicates no significance at a 5% confidence interval. We see from table 3.1 that the distance variable is negative and significant in all industries, except for transport services. The size of the estimated coefficient is, however, notably lower for service sectors. This indicates that, if the services are tradable, distance matters less. The exporter and importer GDP coefficients are estimated precisely and are all positive. Nearly all of them are a bit lower than 1, which is standard in the literature.
Our main interest is in the estimated coefficient for the EU dummy, D EU . For each of the 15 sectors this coefficient is reflected by β s . Table 3 .1 reveals that in twelve out of fifteen industries, the dummy has a positive and significant coefficient (at the 5% confidence level).
Hence, in these sectors, bilateral trade is systematically higher if two countries are both members of the EU. The dummies for Agriculture and Food Processing are among the largest.
Hence, the internal market and the common agricultural policy in the EU intensify intraregional trade in these sectors. For Textiles and Wearing Apparel, we also find a high and significant dummy. After having determined the potential trade increase per sector, the next step is to translate this into non-tariff barriers (NTBs). These are presented in the third column of 
Improving Turkish institutions
It is sometimes argued that EU-membership may work as a catalyst for impact for a wide set of countries, using a gravity estimation approach. They show that a similar law or regulatory framework as in the EU could increase bilateral trade between 12% and 18%.
Better quality institutions and less corruption would increase trade by 17% to 27%. Although we cannot explicitly attribute the extent to what EU-membership will actually improve institutions in Turkey, it is clear that these have to be reformed in order conform to the internal EU market and the acquis communautaire. It can not be excluded that Turkey also reforms its institutions without becoming EU member, but the possible EU membership can be an extra stimulus to carry out these reforms. As we did for the trade effect of the internal market, we translate the trade increase according to the gravity equation into an NTB associated with corruption. We then follow the same procedure as in section 3.2, i.e. we will simulate the gradual removal of the NTB in section 4, reflecting a gradual improvement in the degree of corruption in Turkey. 14 To assess the migration potential from Turkey to the EU, we can follow a similar approach.
Free movement of labour
In particular, we derived the implicit migration elasticity for the income differential from De countries. We see that a large share of Turkish migrants will reside in Germany (76%), which will receive more than 2 million Turkish immigrants. France (8%) and the Netherlands (4%) also host a relatively large share of Turkish immigrants and will receive, respectively, 213 thousand and 107 thousand migrants. 
Economic impact of Turkey's accession to the EU
This section explores the economic implications of the Turkish accession to the internal market, the potential improvement in national institutions, and free movement of labour between Turkey and the EU. We do this by simulating three experiments with the WorldScan model. For these experiments, we discuss the macroeconomic effects. For the simulation of the internal market, we also analyse the sectoral implications. In addition, we perform sensitivity analysis on some important assumptions regarding the simulations. Before elaborating on the results, we first give a brief sketch of the model structure.
The WorldScan model
WorldScan is a computable general equilibrium model for the world economy (see CPB, 1999 4 .2). At the highest nesting, a fixed factor is combined with a composite input. This is relevant only for the sectors agriculture and energy and other raw materials. For all manufacturing and service sectors we assume constant returns to scale in production. In the second level of the production tree, value-added plus energy inputs are combined to form a composite input into production.
This CES-function has a low substitution elasticity (.01), creating a Leontief structure. The production of value-added is modelled by means of a Cobb-Douglas technology with low and high-skilled labour and capital as inputs. In principle, there are fifteen intermediate inputs.
However, only a few intermediate inputs are important in the production process for most industries. 
Accession of Turkey to the internal market
We now discuss the simulation results of the Turkish accession to the internal market. In Table 4 .3 presents the macroeconomic effects of Turkey's accession to the internal market. We see that GDP and consumption in Turkey increase by 0.8% and 1.4%, respectively. A second effect of the accession of Turkey to the EU is a terms-of-trade effect. 18 In particular, we see that Turkey experiences a terms-of-trade gain of 3.5%. This is not accompanied by a terms-of-trade loss in other European countries: the EU-15 experience a terms-of-trade gain of 0.1% and the Accession-10 of 0.2%. The reason for the presence of terms-of-trade gains on both sides is that the abolishment of NTBs entails a reduction in real trade costs. As we measure the terms of trade as the price of exports relative to imports that holds just outside the domestic border, lower NTBs can raise the price of exports relative to imports in both countries. 19 The different magnitude in the terms-of-trade effect among countries depends on the trade intensity between that country and Turkey. In particular, the export share of the Accession-10 and the EU-15 to Turkey is rather small, while the corresponding share of Turkish exports to the EU is relatively large. This explains the large terms-of-trade effect for Turkey relative to the other regions.
Macroeconomic effects
We can compare the effects in Turkey. However trade in that sector is low and the trade increase has no substantial effect on production in that sector. Finally, the exports of Turkey primarily involve sectors with a low productivity such as agriculture and textiles. Although these sectors benefit substantially (see below), this does not create big effects on value added and consumption.
Total exports of Turkey rise by 8.1% and imports by 12.2%. This is less than expected based on the gravity equation. According to the latter method aggregate trade would rise by about 17%. There are several reasons for this difference. First, there is also trade diversion. Increased trade with the EU leads to less trade with other countries. This reduces the increase in total trade. Secondly, Turkey also needs (skilled) labour, capital and intermediate inputs, such as machinery and equipment, for production. These inputs are scarce. This reduces the trade potential. The predictions of the gravity equation do not take account of these general equilibrium effects. The welfare gains of 3.8 billion US$ for the EU countries are negligible related to the total size of the economy. They remain positive, however, as most EU countries suffer only marginally from trade diversion, while they benefit from trade creation. In terms of consumption, the gains are larger tan in terms of GDP because the reduction in NTBs makes imports cheaper. Still, we do not observe these positive effects in the table as the effects remain small. The reason for these small effects is that Turkey is currently a rather unimportant trade partner for the EU.
Reducing NTBs will raise exports for an average EU country by 0.2%. This increase, however, has no visible effect on GDP in one-digit figures.
Sectoral effects
To understand the sectoral effects of the Turkish accession to the internal market, two shocks in each sector are important. First, an industry where an NTB is abolished faces fiercer competition on the home market as the relative price of varieties from the EU falls relative to domestic varieties. This causes a shift in consumer demand away from domestic varieties, leading to higher import intensity.
The drop in demand for domestically-produced commodities lowers the producer price which causes a shift in resources away from the sector where the NTB is abolished. The second shock of the removal of NTBs is that the EU lowers its tariffs. This reduces the relative consumer price of Turkish varieties in the EU, causing a higher demand for these varieties. This exerts an upward effect on the Turkish producer price which attracts resources to this sector.
The net effect is increased specialisation. On balance, a sector is likely to expand if a (large)
NTB is abolished and if that sector exports a large share of its production towards the EU. If a sector produces primarily for the home market, cheaper varieties from the EU may render the impact on production in that sector negative.
In addition to the two demand effects above, the removal of NTBs also exerts a supply effect. This is because the reduction in real trade costs changes input prices for two reasons. First, lower real trade costs reduce the price of intermediate inputs so that production costs fall. Second, production costs might also change by changes in relative factor prices.
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How all these forces work out in the model depends on the details of the input-output structure, comparative advantages and the trade intensity of sectors. 
Institutional reform
The second effect of the Turkish accession to the EU involves the potential improvement in national Turkish institutions. Indeed, to the extent that EU-membership triggers reforms, it can 24 have important implications for the Turkish economy. We simulate institutional reforms by an improvement in the Turkish position on the TI Corruption Perceptions Index from place 64 to 25. This implies an improvement in the competitive position of Turkey, as found by the estimations of the gravity equation of section 3.3: aggregate trade increases by 57%. Table 4 .5
shows the macroeconomic implications of removing the corresponding NTB, which measures the trade barrier associated with the poor position of Turkey on the Corruption ladder. 
Free movement of labour
Turkish accession to the EU may also induce migration. Assuming that 2.7 million Turks will migrate after the accession (see section 3.4), we assess the economic implications by using the WorldScan model. Borjas (1999) argues that the economic impact for the countries of destination and the countries of origin typically depends on the skill level of the immigrants.
We do not know the skills of the immigrants in advance: they can be either skilled, e.g. because educated people are more willing to migrate, or unskilled, e.g. because a restructuring of the agricultural sector in Turkey worsens the economic prospects in Turkey for the unskilled. To cope with this uncertainty, we perform two simulations. In the first simulation, we assume that the composition of Turkish immigrants is equal to the composition of workers in the EU (table 4.6). In a second simulation, we assume the all Turkish immigrants are unskilled. The two simulations thus provide a range for the likely economic consequences of the assumed immigration flow of 2.7 million Turks. (not visible in one-digit figures). The effect on ratio between the wage rate of unskilled and skilled workers is negligible because we assumed that the composition of migrants is identical to that of the destination country.
The effects on consumption per capita suggest a more favourable picture for Turkey and less favourable for the EU-15 than the figures for GDP per capita suggest. This is for two reasons.
First, there are changes in the terms-of-trade. In particular, lower wages in the EU-15 exert a downward pressure on producer prices. The opposite holds for Turkey. This renders the terms of trade effect positive for the Turkey and negative for the EU countries. Accordingly, consumption in Turkey expands and in the EU contracts. Second, we assume that the Turkish migrants transfer part of their income to their families in Turkey. Indeed, as figure 2.5 suggests, Turks provide substantial remittances to their home country. Assuming that future Turkish migrants in Europe will also remit part of their income to their home country, consumption in the EU falls while it increases in Turkey. increases their wage, relative to that of skilled workers by 2.5% points (see the wage ratio).
Consumption and GDP per capita increase by an additional 0.5% as compared to the case of table 4.6. In the EU, the wage of unskilled workers declines relative to that of skilled workers.
For Germany, the decline is 3%, while in the Netherlands it is 0.7%. GDP and consumption per capita decline a bit more if all immigrants are unskilled. The effects for the EU-15 remain fairly small in macroeconomic terms. 
Conclusions
We assess the economic effects of three shocks induced by the accession of Turkey to the EU:
accession to the internal market; an improvement in national institutions in Turkey; and free movement of labour. We thus ignore the potential membership of EMU or the implications of transfers from the EU budget. Moreover, we concentrate on the long-term implications of the Turkish accession to the EU, not to short-term issues, and focus on trade relations, not to foreign direct investment.
In analysing these aspects of the Turkish accession, we first derive a quantitative measure for the potential size of the shocks of the enlargement. Then, these shocks are simulated by means of a CGE model for the world economy. The simulations yield the following results.
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The accession to the internal market yields positive effects for Turkey: private income (a measure for welfare) increases by 4.4 billion US$ (approximately € 3.5 billion, assuming 1€ = 1.25US$), while GDP expands by about 0.8% in the long term. Also the current EU-15 and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe benefit from the accession of Turkey to the EU, albeit only marginally. The largest impact in Turkey is apparent in the sectors Textiles and Wearing Apparel, which expand by respectively 18% and 15%. This comes at the expense of production of these sectors in Southern Europe and Central and Eastern Europe.
The effects of accession to the internal market are small compared to the potential gains of improvements in national institutions in Turkey. Indeed, if EU membership would be able to trigger reforms in Turkey such that the country would climb on the so-called Transparency
International Corruption Perceptions Index to a position comparable to Portugal, our analysis reveals that welfare could increase by 28.2 billion US$ (or € 22.5 billion) while Turkish GDP would expand by 5.6%. These effects are large, relative to the impact of the accession to the internal market. Also the EU benefits from the improvement in national Turkish institutions.
Migration involves a third effect that is potentially important in light of the accession of
Turkey to the EU. An expected inflow of 2.7 million Turks would reduce GDP in Turkey by between 1.8% and 2.2%, and increase it in the EU-15 by between 0.5% and 0.7%, depending on the skill composition of the migrants. In per capita terms, income in Turkey will rise while it falls slightly in the EU. If migrants are primarily unskilled, also wage inequality in the EU-15 is likely to rise.
Summing up, accession of Turkey to the EU will bring economic benefits for Turkey, without exerting a big effect on current member countries of the EU or the countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Some sectors in Turkey will expand substantially, such as Textiles, but at the expense of these sectors in Central and Eastern Europe. The largest economic gains can probably be obtained through reforms of national institutions in Turkey that improve the functioning of the public sector and provide transparency to investors and traders.
